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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

Respondent, James Carpenter (hereafter "Carpenter") owned a lunchroom
modular building and an office modular building (hereafter "buildings"). Carpenter
stored the buildings on the real property of Herbert Turrell and Marianne Turrell,
husband and wife. Herbert Turrell subsequently passed away. Approximately two
years later, the Appellant (hereafter "Turrell"), son of Herbert Turrell and Marianne
Turrell took possession of the buildings and sold them to third parties without any prior
knowledge, consent or authority of Carpenter.
Carpenter filed suit against Turrell for conversion to recover the fair market value
of the buildings from Turrell. Turrell responded to Carpenter's complaint by admitting
Carpenter's allegation that Turrell " ... without Plaintiffs knowledge, authorization or
consent sold one storage building to Leonard Turpin on November 26, 2006 and the
other storage building to Dan Seldon on December 8, 2006." (See Turrell's Answer:
Paragraph 5). Turrell also incorporated in his Answer an affirmative defense that
Carpenter's claims are barred by Idaho Code §9-202(3).
A trial was held and the Trial Court entered a Judgment for Carpenter concluding
in pertinent part that:
1. Carpenter as owner of the buildings has a gratuitous bailment relationship
with Herbert Turrell and Marianne Turrell.
2. That while Turrell had been acting as an agent for his mother, Marianne
Turrell, Turrell without authority of Marianne Turrell personally assumed dominion and
control of Carpenter's buildings and permanently deprived Carpenter possession of said
buildings by the sale of the same to Seldon and Turpin.
3. Notwithstanding Turrell's allegation he was unaware of Carpenter's rights
regarding the buildings, the conversion of the buildings to his own use rendered Turrell
liable to Carpenter due to wrongful conversion.
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4. Idaho Code §9-202(3) was not relevant as a defense to Turrell's claim since
Carpenter's lawsuit did not include a claim against the Estate of Herbert Turrell or
Marianne Turrell personally. Therefore, any testimony regarding any agreement or
conversation between Carpenter and Herbert Turrell is not barred by Idaho Code §9202(3).

B. Statement of Facts
Carpenter is the sole owner of Quality Modular Homes, a business involved in
the buying and selling of modular homes. In May 2003, Carpenter purchased two
buildings. (See Exhibit 3). During this time Herbert Turrell was a good friend and
neighbor of Carpenter. They both lived on Yukon Road, Post Falls, Idaho
approximately one-quarter mile apart. While in the presence of Dave Bouder and
Herbert Turrell, Carpenter was unable to store the buildings on his property due to their
size. Carpenter and Herbert Turrell had a conversation about the storage of the
buildings on Herbert Turrell's property. Herbert Turrell allowed Carpenter to store the
buildings on his property. (Tr 29, L 1-9). Carpenter and Dave Bouder made one trip per
building to Herbert Turrell's property to store the buildings. While moving the buildings
on the Herbert Turrell property, Herbert Turrell was present, observed the moving of the
buildings onto his property and did not object or contest the placement and storage of
the same on his property. (Tr 91, L 15-22). Herbert Turrell's wife, Marianne Turrell was
not present during this time. (Tr 91, L 9-14).
During this period of time Carpenter had built an addition to Herbert and
Marianne Turrell's mobile home (Tr 72, L 17-18) and had moved three cabins from
Lake Chatcolet to the Herbert Turrell property. (Tr 71, L-12-13, Tr 72, L-2).
Herbert Turrell passed away in the early part of 2005. Carpenter testified that no
funeral service was held.
As referenced in the Turrell's Opening Brief, Herbert and Marianne Turrell lived
on a five acre parcel on Yukon Road, Post Falls, Idaho. The property over time
became a storage for just about anything that Herbert Turrell was able to collect, such
2

as old cars, scrap metal, etc. Most of the items stored on Herbert Turrell's property was
not marketable except for salvage value. See Exhibit "D". The only buildings being
stored on Herbert Turrell's property were Carpenter's buildings and the Lake Chatcolet
cabins. Such items were readily distinguishable from the remainder of the "junk" on the
Herbert Turrell property. (Tr 146, L 12-25).
Marianne Turrell acknowledged that Carpenter and Herbert Turrell were friends
and she observed both of them outside talking at various times but she never paid
attention to what they talked about, nor was she ever involved in any of Herbert Turrell's
affairs. (Tr 95, L 21-22; Tr 107, L 19-20; Tr 112, L 21-23) Marianne Turrell
acknowledged that she was not aware of all the personal property on the property or
even the buildings being on the property and that "everybody stored stuff it seemed
like." (Tr 107, L 17).
Subsequent to Herbert Turrell's passing, Carpenter showed the buildings to
several perspective purchasers without success. During each showing, Carpenter
always made contact with Marianne Turrell to advise her of his presence and purpose
for being there (Tr 38, L-24-25; Tr 39, L 20-22).
Carpenter also received a telephone call from Turrell regarding the status and
sale price of the buildings after Turrell was contacted by an interested party. (Tr 42, L
19-20; Tr 45, L 8-12; Tr 46, L 9-10). The buildings did not sell as a result of this
contact.
In 2007, Carpenter was driving by Marianne Turrell's property and noticed that
the buildings were gone. Carpenter telephoned Turrell and left a message with Turrell's
wife to call him about the status of the buildings. Turrell never returned Carpenter's
telephone call. Carpenter called again and made contact with Turrell. Turrell told
Carpenter that he had gave them away. (Tr 44, L 1-2). Turrell acknowledges that he
did not tell Carpenter that he had sold the buildings. (Tr 125, L 16-18).
Being in the business of moving buildings, Carpenter was able to trace the status
of these particular buildings and determined that Turrell had sold the buildings to
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Leonard Turpin and Dan Seldon.
Upon being confronted by Carpenter with this information, Turrell finally
acknowledged the sale of the buildings to Turpin and Seldon and did not dispute
Carpenter's claim to ownership of the buildings during this telephone contact. (Tr 44, L11-19; Tr 171, L 1-12).
In various attempts to legitimize Turrell's sale of the buildings, Turrell denied that
he knew that Carpenter owned or made a claim to the buildings. Turrell felt that his
father owned the buildings and wanted to attach the buildings to his mobile home. It is
unrebutted that Carpenter built an addition to the mobile home. Carpenter further
testified that the buildings would have had to been substantially altered and remodeled
to pass code to render them habitable as an addition to the mobile home. (Tr 202, L 417).
Turrell also claims that he assumed the buildings were his father's because it
was just like all the other junk stored on his father's property. (Compare Exhibits 1 (AH), 2 (A-E), with Exhibit D).
Turrell's brother, Tom Turrell, testified that Carpenter telephoned him on three to
four occasions to see when Carpenter could move the buildings to his brother's, Terry
Turrell's property in Bayview, Idaho. Carpenter testified that he called Tom Turrell once
to determine when he could move the Lake Chatcolet cabins (not the buildings) to Terry
Turrell's Bayview property. Turrell did not proffer any testimony corroborating and/or
confirming Terry Turrell's testimony in this regard nor acknowledge any knowledge of
the telephone calls as alleged by Terry Turrell. (Tr 171, L 2-12). Turrell repeatedly
testified that when he took possession of the buildings and sold them to third parties, he
was acting either as a Personal Representative of the Herbert Turrell Estate or a
Successor Trustee of the Turrell Living Trust (hereafter Trust).
Upon being confronted by Carpenter as to the status/sale of the buildings, Turrell
never indicated that he was acting as a Personal Representative of the Estate of
Herbert Turrell and/or Trustee of the Trust.
4

The Trust was never registered with the Kootenai County District Court nor was
Turrell's status as Successor Trustee of the Trust registered in any Court in Idaho. (Tr
178, L 14-19).
The record does not reflect any evidence other than Turrell's own self serving
statements that he was acting a Personal Representative of the Estate of Herbert
Turrell or that a formal probate of the Herbert Turrell had been filed either prior to or at
the time of sale of the buildings. (Tr 166, L 14-15).
Turrell sold the buildings to Leonard Turpin and Dan Seldon personally and
executed sale receipts reflecting the sale of the buildings in Turrell's name only and not
in his alleged capacity as either a Personal Representative of Herbert Turrell's estate or
as Successor Trustee of the Living Trust. (Exhibits 4 and 5).
Although Turrell was sure that all property located on Herbert Turrell's property
was his father's, Turrell did acknowledge that his father stored some personal property
as a friends residence in Rathdrum, Idaho. Like Carpenter herein, Herbert Turrell was
also involved in a gratuitous bailment situation. (Tr 167, L 21·23; Tr 171, L 16-20).
Notwithstanding the specific reasons Turrell tendered to the Trial Court regarding
the conversion of Carpenter's buildings, Turrell acknowledged that not all the items
stored on his father's property has been sold or removed (Tr 148, L 2-14) and Marianne
is still residing at the home. (Tr 116, L 8-9).

C. Appellant's Issues Presented on Appeal
Turrell raises six issues on aP.peal which are summarized as follows:
1. Issues 1 through 4 (Opening Brief page 9) can be summarized as follows:
Whether Idaho's Dead Man Statute is applicable to Carpenter's claim of conversion
against Turrell in the absence of any formal probate proceeding pending, or in the
absence of Turrell formally documenting his status as Personal Representative or in the
absence Turrell formally documenting his status Successor Trustee of the Trust at the
time that he converted Carpenter's buildings to his own use and sold the same.
2. Whether the Trial Court's finding of gross negligence is supported by the
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evidence is a germane or relevant issue as it applies to the Trial Court's finding that
Turrell was culpable of conversion.
3. Whether Judgment was properly entered against Peggy Turrell, spouse of
Turrell in light of the evidence that Turrell was personally involved in the conversion of
Carpenter's buildings and failed to substantiate the status of the proceeds of the sale of
said buildings.

II.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

In addition to the issues raised by Turrell in his Opening Brief on Page 9,
Carpenter contends that the following issue is germane:
1. Whether Carpenter is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal since
Turrell arguments simply request the Court to re weigh and/or recharacterize substantial
competent evidence which substantiate as to the inapplicability of the Dead Man's
Statute to the instant case. (I.C. §12-121, IAR 41).

Ill.
ARGUMENT
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE
BEFORE THIS COURT

The standard of review applicable to this appeal has been summarized by the
Court as follows:
When a case has been tried to the Court without a jury, we will not disturb the
Trial Court's Findings of Fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a); In Re Williamson, 135 Idaho 452, 454,(2001); Rueth vs. State, 103
Idaho 74, 77 (1982). In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, this Court
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does not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses as to the Trial Court.
Williamson, supra; Kootenai Electrical Coop., Inc. vs. Washington Power Co., 127
Idaho 432, 434-35(1995). "The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions which are based
on substantial although conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal." Sun
Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. vs. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118
(1990). "The Trial Court's Findings of Fact will be liberally construed in favor of the
judgment entered." Id. With respect to the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law, we
exercise free review Erickson vs. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430 (Id. App 2002).

B. IDAHO DEAD MAN'S STATUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE

Turrell's appeal primarily focuses on whether Idaho's Dead Man's Statute (JC§9202(3)) applies to a Trust vis a vis Turrell's uncorroborated and unverified testimony
that at all times pertinent to his possession and sale of Carpenter's buildings, he
perceived himself as a Successor Trustee of the Trust.
The overwhelming evidence supports the finding of the Trial Court that Turrell
was not a Successor Trustee at the time he converted Carpenter's buildings. The
record fails to reflect an initial registration of the Trust or an Amended Registration
designating Turrell as Successor Trustee of the Trust as required by Idaho Code §15-7101 et. seq. The sales receipts provided to Leonard Turpin and Dan Seldon,
purchasers of Carpendter's buildings, reflect that Turrell was acting in his personal
capacity. (See Exhibits 4 and 5).
Turrell objected to any testimony proffered by Carpenter relating to any
conversation with Herbert Turrell regarding the storage of the buildings on Herbert
Turrell's property. The Trial Court concluded that "Idaho Code §9-202(3) is not relevant
because the Estate of Herbert Turrell is not a party or a named Defendant in this
matter." (R, page 72). The Trial Court did not conclude that" ... protection of Idaho
Code §9-202(3) was available only to Personal Representatives formally appointed by
7

the Court." (Opening Brief page 10). Turrell's objection is not a barr to Carpenter's
claim. There is no evidence that the Estate of Herbert Turrell was formally or informally
probated or involved in the conversion of Carpenter's buildings. There was no factual
basis to include the Estate of Herbert Turrell as a party Defendant herein.
Regarding the applicability of the Dead Man's Statute, Turrell does acknowledge
that
"... extrinsic evidence and the testimony of disinterested witnesses to the
conversations or events giving rise to the claim can be presented, the interested
party to the 'communication or agreement' is not permitted absence such
testimony to testify as to what the decedent said or promised since to do so
would allow opportunistic claims to make uncorroborated and fraudulent claims
against the estate of someone who can no longer defend himself." (Opening
Brief page 10).
A disinterested witness, Dave Souder, corroborated Carpenter's testimony that
Herbert Turrell acquiesced, did not object to and observed Carpenter moving two
buildings on to Herbert Turrell's property to store the same. (P 89, L 11-16; P 91, L1522).
Turrell's appeal suggests that the Dead Man's Statute is a claims barr statute
rather than an evidentiary barr statute. In this regard he had little choice. Turrell
acknowledged that he converted and sold Carpenter's buildings. Turrell felt his only
defense to Carpenter's claim was to suppress any conversation between Carpenter and
Herbert Turrell regarding the storage of said buildings. In light of the gratuitous
bailment situation, (R 71 ), Carpenter did not need proffer any hearsay testimony from
Herbert Turrell. As corroborated by Souder, the facts are clear and uncontroverted.
Carpenter purchased the buildings and moved them on Herbert Turrell's property on
two separate occasions in the presence and without objection of Herbert Turrell.
Rather than moving to dismiss Carpenter's Complaint for failure to join an
indispensable third party or in the alternative joining the Estate of Herbert Turrell and or
the Trust as a third party defendant, Turrell chose to personally defend this litigation.
Turrel!'s status in this litigation is inconsistent with his attempt to hide behind guise of a
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Trustee in an attempt to barr Carpenter's claim.
Turrell fails to recognize statutory differences involved in probating an estate and
the formalities required in the registration of a Trust. In this regard Turrell
misrepresents the facts as it relates to the rationale of Idaho Code §9-202(3) (See
Opening Brief page 11 ). Even if it is determined that Turrell was acting as a Personal
Representative or as Successor Trustee, the terms and conditions of the Trust was that
Estate would vest in the surviving Grantor (Marianne Turrell). As such, since there was
still a surviving Grantor, Turrell was not acting" ... to wind up a decedent's estate and
affairs." (Opening Brief page 11, Defendant's Exhibit "H"). Turrell consistently
attempted to recite hypotheticals and other speculative arguments in his attempt to
render Idaho Code §9-202(3) applicable. These attempts were unsuccessful before the
Trial Court.
The facts do not provide a proper predicate for this Court to consider Turrell's
request in this regard.

The Estate of Herbert Turrell and the Trust are not parties to

this action.
In the event the Court determines that the Dead Man's Statute did preclude
Carpenter's testimony regarding any conversations he had with Herbert Turrell, such
error is harmless. Substantial, competent and uncontroverted evidence exists that
Carpenter stored the buildings on Herbert Turrell's property under a gratuitous bailment
situation. Idaho Code §9-202(3) is irrelevant to this bailment status.
Nevertheless, Turrell insists that:
'This Court should according hold that the legislative intent to protect a
decedent's estate from uncorroborated claims whether or not estate is subject to
a formal probate and whether or not the Personal Trustee is a successor of an
estate planning trust." (Opening Brief p 12).

C. TIM TURRELL WAS NOT A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

Contrary to the requirements of Idaho Code § 15-3-301 et. seq or Idaho Code
§15-3-401 et. seq, Turrell insists that the Trial Court erred in dismissing his claim that
9

he was acting as a Personal Representative of the Estate of Herbert Turrell when he
sold the buildings. Turrell argues that the Trial Court did not have any law or evidence
supporting its conclusion that "Tim had not been appointed by the Court in a formal
probate proceeding." (Opening Brief page 12).
The record is void of any evidence that the Estate of Herbert Turrell was either
informally or formally probated or that Letters Testamentary were issued by the Court
appointing Turrell as Personal Representative of the Estate of Herbert Turrell. The
burden is on Turrell to substantiate such allegation. He did not. It is difficult to fathom
what specific evidence Turrell refers to which would provide a basis for the Trial Court
to determine that Turrell had been appointed by a Court" ... in a formal probate
proceeding."
Turrell merges and fails to distinguish the status of the Personal Representative
of an estate vis a vis a Successor Trustee of a trust. In one instance he is asserting
that he is a Personal Representative of the Estate of Herbert Turrell. In another
instance he is asserting that he is the Successor Trustee of the Trust. Turrell's selfserving statement were not corroborated by any other testimony and/or formal
documentation as required by Idaho Code. The Trial Court's finding that Tim Turrell
was not a Personal Representative is based upon Turrell's failure to verify this
unsubstantiated allegation.
Turrell has presented no authority to support his position that he personally had
standing to barr any testimony pertaining to any conversation between Carpenter and
Herbert Turrell pursuant to Idaho Code §9-202(3). Idaho Code §9-202(3) does not
exonerate Turrell for the conversion of Carpenter's buildings.

D. THE REAL QUESTION IS WHO IS ATTEMPTING TO BACKDOOR
THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE

It is an ironic twist of logic that Turrell is claiming that Carpenter is attempting to
"backdoor" the Dead Man's Statute by filing a cause of action against Turrell personally.
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(See Opening Brief page 13).
A review of Turrell's testimony is replete with his attempts to "backdoor" the

application of the Dead Man's Statute. The record is void of any factual foundation
which sustains the relevance of the statute to his objections and arguments. It is
unknown exactly to what extent and how the Dead Man's Statute applies to Carpenter's
claim. Turrell has argued that it is a claims barred statute in one instance and in other
instances argues that it is an evidentiary/testimonial barr statute. Even the Trial Court
had a difficult time parlaying Turrell's application of the Dead Man's Statute to the facts
of this case.
Unfortunately, it is again necessary to respond to this issue by again reiterating
that the evidence before the Trial Court directly contradicts Turrell's allegations. Turrell
signed the sales receipts in his personal capacity. There was no informal or formal
probate of Herbert Turrell's Estate. Turrell did not register his status as Successor
Trustee of the Trust as contemplated by Idaho Code § 15-7-101 et. seq. (Tr 118, L 1215, Tr 156, L 21-23, Tr 178, L 14-19). A third party would not be able to verify either a
probate of Herbert Turrell's Estate or the existence of a Family Trust. While Turrell's
name appeared on his mother's bank account (Tr 107, L 1) so did his other brothers.
(Tr 164, L 16-25, Tr 165, L 1-13).
Notwithstanding Turrell's self serving statements pertaining to his perceived
status as either a Personal Representative or a Successor Trustee, the Trial Court
concluded that Turrell acted individually when he took dominion and control of
Carpenter's buildings and sold them to third parties.
In an effort to distract the Court and minimize his exposure, Turrell attempts to
justify his behavior by alleging he was unaware of Carpenter's rights over the buildings.
Such lack of knowledge as to who actually owns the buildings is irrelevant.
Restatement of Torts (2 nd ) §222, 223, 224. Wiseman vs. Schaffer, 115 Idaho 537 (Ct.
App 1989).
Turrell also attempts to assume facts not in evidence by extending the rationale
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of the Dead Man's Statute defense to preclude Carpenter's attempts to recover the
buildings from Herbert Turrell's Estate in the event that the buildings still existed.
(Opening Brief page 14). This argument fails in that it is premised upon facts which are
irrelevant and not applicable to the instant case. In the event that the buildings still
existed then it is obvious Carpenter would have had to file the suit against the Estate of
Herbert Turrell and/or against Marianne Turrell personally. In this instance different
facts would obviously been presented to sustain Carpenter's burden. Such an analogy
is inapposite.
Turrell cannot simply invoke the application of Idaho Code §9-202(3) by alleging,
as an after thought, that he was unilaterally acting as a Personal Representative or
Successor Trustee without any formal appointment confirming the same. (Opening Brief
page 14). The Ko/ouch cited by Turrell (Opening Brief page 14) confirms a need for a
formal appointment and to this extent is inapplicable to the instant case.
This is not a case where "... Carpenter ... successfully eluded the statute by
suing Turrell as an individual." (Opening Brief page 14). This is a case where the Trial
Court held that Turrell could not hide behind the Dead Man's Statute to barr Carpenter's
conversations with Herbert Turrell pertaining to the buildings.

E. WHETHER CARPENTER WAS ENTITLED TO IMMEDIATE
POSSESSION OF THE BUILDINGS IS IRRELEVANT

Turrell argues that Carpenter was not entitled to immediate possession of the
buildings and therefore his claim against Turrell must fail. (Opening Brief page 15).
Turrell cites the Lusarcase as authority for the requirement of "immediate possession."

Lusar is significantly distinguishable from the case at hand. It dealt with a cause of
action between a trucking company which as pledger, pledged certain collateral to a
secured party for a bond. The issue before the Lusar Court was whether the pledgor
had the right to possession of the collateral at the time of demand and refusal of the
12

secured party to return the collateral.
Lusar did not deal with a gratuitous bailment situation as in the instant case.

Additionally, Turrell was not acting as a bailee of the buildings at the time of his
conversion and sale of the same. Turrell's motives in this regard are irrelevant.
Carpenter's cause of action against Turrell was premised on Turrell being a tortfeasor,
not a bailee.
Turrell has not cited any authority which would deny a bailor immediate
possession of his property from the bailee in a gratuitous bailment situation. Even in
the event that Turrell is able to cite authority to sustain his argument that Carpenter
must show a right of "immediate possession" of bail property before the bailee can be
culpable of conversion, Turrell lacks standing to raise this issue and his arguments in
this regard fail. It is difficult to understand Turrell's logic that Carpenter would have to
have a right of possession of the buildings superior to that of Turrell's prior to Turrell's
personally converting and selling the same. Turrell simply had no rights of possession
of Carpenter's buildings.

F. PERSPECTIVE EXAMPLE

Notwithstanding the various assumptions and arguments tendered by Turrell in
support of his appeal, on page 16 of his Opening Brief, Turrell again attempts to explain
and/or justify his appeal "by example".
To the extent that such example sets forth additional hypothetical with rhetorical
questions, no further comment or argument in this regard is necessary.

G. TURRELL IS BEING HELD LIABLE NOT FOR A BREACH OF A BAILMENT
CONTRACT BUT FOR CONVERSION OF CARPENTER'S BUILDINGS

Turrell has erroneously interpreted the Trial Court's decision that Judgment
entered against Turrell was premised upon a breach of a bailment contract. The Trial
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Court's comments pertaining to the bailment status by and between Carpenter and
Herbert Turrell serves as a predicate for its decision. In a gratuitous bailment, no
contract exists. There was no specific bailment, gratuitous or otherwise between
Carpenter and Tim Turrell.
Neither the Estate of Herbert Turrell or Marianne Turrell personally converted
Carpenter's buildings. The record is void of any evidence that Marianne Turrell knew
what Herbert Turrell was doing with those buildings. (Tr 101, L 15-16, 18, Tr 107, L 1920). Marianne Turrell testified "everyone stored stuff there." (Tr 107, L 17). The record
is void of any evidence as to whether Marianne Turrell even knew the buildings were on
the property. (Tr 103, L 17-19). All Marianne Turrell knew was that Herbert Turrell and
Carpenter had arrangements but she was not aware of what they were. (Tr 113, L 1-3,
Tr 108, L 11-12).
Turrell analysis of the Trial Court's conclusion that Marianne Turrell and Turrell
were grossly negligent for selling the buildings is misplaced. Be it as it may, the Trial
Court was commenting on an issue raised by Turrell. This particular comment was not
alternative theory or a basis of the Trial Court's decision. The Trial Court's decision
was premised solely on a finding and conclusion that Turrell personally exercised
dominion and control of the building and permanently deprived Carpenter possession of
the same by their sale to third parties. (See R page 72).

H. AS WIFE OF TURRELL, PEGGY TURRELL IS PERSONALLY
LIABLE TO CARPENTER

Carpenter named Peggy Turrell as a party and alleged that Turrell's actions
benefitted the Turrell marital community. While Turrell denied this allegation, Turrell did
not move the Court at any time during the proceeding to dismiss Peggy Turrell as a
party defendant. Since this issue was neither raised, argued or addressed at the Trial
Court, this Court must proceed on the assumption that the Defendant's acts benefitted
the community and in turn Peggy Turrell.
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This Court determined that Turrell committed a tort, the conversion of
Carpenter's buildings. Debts incurred by one spouse in the commission of a tort can be
satisfied out of community assets. Hansen vs. Blevins, 84 Idaho 49 (1962). While
alleging that he remitted the proceeds of the sale of Carpenter's building to Marianne
Turrell, Turrell never produced any verification of this remittance either through a
deposit slip or by testimony by Marianne Turrell. The receipts signed by Turrell
personally regarding the conversion and sale of Carpenter's buildings reflect that the
Turrell community benefitted from Turrell's tortious act.

I. RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

This Court has previously observed: "Attorney's fees are awardable if an appeal
does no more than simply invite an Appellant Court to second guess the Trial Court on
conflicting evidence." Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. vs. Traveler's Leasing
Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 120 (1990) Anderson vs. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 408 (2001). In

granting Carpenter's claim for relief, the Trial Court's Findings of Fact was based upon
testimony and record evidence. In appealing to this Court, Turrell did no more than
argue the evidence should be reweighed.
This Court has also previously observed: "An award of Attorney's is appropriate
'if the law is well settled and the appellants have made no substantial showing at the
District Court misapplied the law."' Bowles vs. Pro lndiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 378
(Idaho 1999). As a basis of Turrell's request for this Court's review of the Trial Court's
opinion, Turrell cites his own testimony, the same being based upon his own
perceptions, feelings and impressions. Turrell had presented no specific factual
documentation to sustain the predicate for his legal arguments as presented herein.
Said legal arguments are unreasonable and irrelevant. While Turrell has attempted to
show that the Trial Court misapplied the law, he is primarily requesting this Court to
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reverse the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and adopt his own self serving and "after the
fact" characterization of his status and role in this particular matter.
Substantial, competent evidence exists to sustain the Trial Court's finding that
Carpenter owned the buildings, stored the buildings on the property of Herbert Turrell
vis a vis a gratuitous bailment status and that Turrell without any prior knowledge,

consent or authorization of Carpenter assumed dominion and control of the buildings
and then personally converted the same to his own use and sold them.
Based upon the authority cited above and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law of the Trial Court, Carpenter respectfully requests that he is entitled to an award
of attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of this appeal.

IV.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the reason and authorities as set forth above, Carpenter requests
that this Court affirm the Trial Court's decision. Carpenter further requests that he be
awarded his reasonable attorney's fees and costs in defending this appeal.
DATED this/ ;;)'t"day of
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